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Modern regulators have long grappled with the challenges of regulating 
multinational corporations and their cross-border supply chains. There is a 
tendency, in this context, to view the problem as one where the most serious 
or common abuses are to be found in the Global South, but the effective 
remedies mostly need to be found in the Global North. This article discusses 
recent examples of expansive, creative judicial activity from India, 
Colombia and the African regional judicial system to challenge this 
assumption. Some of today’s Southern judicial activity can break the 
stereotype in interesting and important ways, and our thinking about 
regulation in this context needs adjustment accordingly. 
I INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread recognition that multinational corporate abuses (hereafter 
MNC abuses) require a multi-pronged response. This is nowhere truer than in 
the regulation of corporate supply chains. But there is a tendency, nearly as 
widespread, to frame problems such as the regulation of supply chains as 
problems where the most serious or common abuses are to be found in the 
Global South, and the effective remedies mostly need to be found in the 
Global North. There is, I should emphasise at the outset, much that is realistic 
about this view, and my aim is certainly not to try to prove that it is false. But 
we do need to adjust it, for it is a view that is somewhat out of step with the 
times. Developments in some Global South jurisdictions offer much more 
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powerful tools against MNC abuses than is often appreciated, and do so in 
ways that should affect our strategic and scholarly calculations about how we 
should construct responses to global supply chain abuses and related problems 
of MNC regulation. This article aims to illustrate this point, using some select 
examples.   
To emphasise again: the claim of this article is by no means that the need for 
North-based approaches will go away any time soon. It remains a reliable 
generalisation that, compared to their Southern equivalents, Northern 
institutions are stronger, Northern law firms and NGOs have greater 
resources, and Northern consumers have more market power. 
But two things are weakening this generalisation. The first is simply that the 
North/South gap is an increasingly dubious category. In some of its 
interpretations — for example, as the divide between the place where rich 
people live and the place where poor people live — the gap has not existed for 
fifty years.1 In other interpretations — for example as a divide marking 
different degrees of economic development more broadly — the gap is 
closing. This is reflected in the way the very categories ‘Global North’ and 
‘Global South’ are becoming less and less useful. I use them here only 
because of the need for some convenient shorthand to speak to the 
generalisations just made, and because the other options (such as ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing’ are worse still).2 I will say little about this general narrowing 
of the gap because its effects are obvious enough: insofar as it is a trend 
towards the South just becoming more like the North, we have no real 
difficulty understanding the trend, because it is about familiar things. We 
may, however, need to update ourselves about just where and how the gap is 
narrowing, and the African regional developments discussed in this article, 
particularly, are an example of that.  
The second factor weakening the generalisation requires more analysis. Some 
Southern developments are not just about ‘catching up’ in doing what the 
North does, but are distinctive. Judicial behaviour is an example. In some 
Southern countries, the weakness of other local institutions has propelled the 
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judiciary to try to fill the gap.3 The precise story varies from country to 
country. But the broad result is that the judiciary ends up acting very 
expansively in policy areas in ways that do not usually occur in the North.4 
These Southern developments offer a novel challenge to a range of theoretical 
and descriptive understandings of the world. And, as we shall see, they have 
important implications for the regulation of MNCs and their supply chains — 
some potential, some already in full swing. 
II INDIA: PIL, FORESTS AND MINING 
Over the last forty years, the Indian Supreme Court has had a good claim to be 
the most powerful court in the world. Since 2014, for the first time in decades, 
it has had to contend with an assertive governing party with its own outright 
majority, in the form of Prime Minister Modi’s BJP, and this may change 
things.5 But at least prior to that date no other court in the world could match 
it for sheer unbridled ability to arrogate to itself decisions on a vast range of 
issues. Among these issues, of interest to us here, has been that of MNC 
activities at the far end of supply chains and, in particular, the regulation of 
mining activities in environmentally sensitive areas affecting vulnerable 
cultural communities. Two examples will suffice for our purposes here.  
A Mining in Bellary 
The district of Bellary lies in the state of Karnataka in south-western India. It 
is an important site of iron ore and other mining, and in many respects the 
story of this mining activity follows a script that will be familiar to those 
interested in MNC regulation.6 The mining has had a series of significant 
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Publishing, 2017) 234–40. 
6 For the background discussed in this paragraph, see Report on the Reference Made by the 
Government of Karnataka under Section 7(2-A) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (Part – 
II), No. COMPT/LOK/BCD/89/2007 (27 July 2011) <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal. 
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impacts on local communities and the environment. The corporations 
concerned have often acted with various degrees of disregard for these 
impacts in the name of recouping their investment and generating a profit. 
Local and state-level regulation of illegal mining activities has often been 
limited due to institutional weakness and corruption. And a variety of 
institutions and actors, including local and international activists, a state anti-
corruption ombudsman (the Lokayuta), and a commission of enquiry under 
retired Justice M B Shah have attempted to respond. But what may not seem 
so standard, at least to those unfamiliar with the Indian system, is the role 
played in these efforts by the Indian Supreme Court.  
One key prerequisite for the Court’s intervention in the case had been 
established some years previously. The Court had been attempting to deal 
with another case raising broad and complex issues about the management of 
India’s forests in light of the many different cultural and economic groups that 
have various interests in them. The Court’s response in that case included 
setting up, in May 2002, a special commission of experts that would oversee 
the issue, conduct research, suggest remedial approaches to the Court, and 
monitor their implementation.7 The Court makes regular use of this 
commission device in a variety of settings; in this forestry context, the 
commission came to be known as the Central Empowered Commission 
(CEC). As is common practice, the Court did not tightly delineate the CEC’s 
mandate, and it was impliedly intended to continue to function for as long as 
the Court felt it necessary to engage with issues related to forestry 
management.8 
Thus when the issue of mining in the forests in Bellary reached the Supreme 
Court in 2011, the Court’s natural response was to have the CEC investigate 
the matter. The CEC’s report revealed widespread illegal mining.9 Largely on 
the strength of that report, the Court shut down all mining activities in the 
district while the matter could be further investigated and illegal mining 
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distinguished from legal mining and stopped. Mining in Bellary would stop 
for two years before the Court began to lift the ban.10 
This is obviously a dramatic order. Bellary’s mining supports a multi-billion-
dollar steel industry that relies on the local iron ore deposits. The order 
therefore reflects a far greater willingness to take strong action antipathetic to 
the foreign investment environment than many would expect from a Southern 
institution, or from a court. It is also an order that rests on a non-standard 
amount of judicially-driven investigative work, and this is highly significant 
for my argument. 
A common concern is that litigation-based strategies in the South will be 
hampered by the relative inability of local actors to generate the sort of 
evidentiary record needed to mount a serious legal challenge to MNC activity. 
This is frequently a very real concern. But it is a concern about the difficulties 
of credible litigation in the context of resource imbalances and widespread 
poverty, and that is an issue that the Indian Supreme Court has been actively 
grappling with since the late 1970s. Its response is known as Public Interest 
Litigation or PIL. Although the precise features and concerns of the PIL 
model have evolved over the years,11 some features have remained constant. 
The main constant across the decades has been that judges do whatever they 
decide is necessary to act on problems that they feel should be acted upon, 
including trying to remove whatever obstacles might otherwise prevent those 
whose rights have been violated from being able to vindicate them in court. 
Judges have taken active, innovative approaches to issues including standing, 
evidence, and remedies in order to compensate for the relative weakness of 
many potential Indian litigants. The commission device is an example of this, 
seeking to remove from the litigants what can be the heavy burden of 
investigating a complex issue, and proposing possible remedial action that a 
court might credibly order. 
                                                 
10 See Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v State of Karnataka (2012) 7 SCC 407; Samaj 
Parivartana Samudaya v State of Karnataka (2013) 8 SCC 154. See also, James Crabtree, 
‘India Partially Lifts Mining Ban’, Financial Times (online), 18 April 2013 <https://www. 
ft.com/content/d0ea5fe8-a829-11e2-8e5d-00144feabdc0>. 
11 Important recent efforts to give a sense of the PIL model, including its horizontal evolution, 
include Anuj Bhuwania, Courting the People: Public Interest Litigation in Post-Emergency 
India (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Arun K Thiruvengadam, ‘Swallowing a Bitter 
PIL? Reflections on Progressive Strategies for Public Interest Litigation in India’ in Oscar 
Vilhena, Upendra Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds), Transformative Constitutionalism: 
Comparing the Apex Courts in Brazil, India and South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 
2013) 519; Surya Deva, ‘Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review’ (2009) 28 
Civil Justice Quarterly 19; Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Public Interest Litigation in India: Exploring 
Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability’ (2007) 19 Journal of 
Environmental Law 293. 
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In other words, the fact that local inhabitants or NGOs or law firms may not 
be well-resourced does not necessarily make Southern judicial strategies a 
long shot — at least to the extent that Southern judges are able and willing to 
take the burden off litigants in the kinds of ways envisaged by the Indian PIL 
model. It also becomes harder for MNCs to simply out-spend local actors if a 
court is taking over many of the burdens of the case (with many of the costs, 
such as the costs of commissions’ work, usually being passed on to the 
government).  
In addition, PIL-type strategies can also have a force-multiplier effect on the 
actions of Southern NGOs and social movements — and, by the same token, 
on the contributions of their Northern supporters. To be sure, the idea that PIL 
can turn one poor person’s handwritten plea into a mass litigation has mostly 
been a myth, and perhaps especially so in recent decades. In practice, an 
effective PIL on a large-scale issue often requires real legal resources, 
mobilised social action, and so on.12 PIL’s real significance, especially in its 
more recent instantiations, is not so much about removing the need for local 
actors to have money and skills and social power. It is about leveraging what 
they have, so that a relatively modest contribution by petitioners can be 
turned, by judicial effort, into a full-scale credible judicial engagement with 
the problem. It is in this sense that PIL techniques can be a force-multiplier. If 
they are in use, the resources needed to get over the threshold of what is 
required for effective litigation will be much fewer than they would need to be 
if the judiciary adopted a less active role. A small local effort can go a lot 
further. And this means that a Northern NGO, understandably reluctant to 
commit the kind of resources necessary to bear all the costs of a litigation, 
may be able to re-do its calculations. A much smaller investment of skills or 
money may be sufficient to start a judicial action that will largely run and pay 
for itself. Southern litigation can be a very different strategic prospect to the 
extent that PIL-type strategies are in operation. 
B Mining in the Niyamgiri Hills 
The other Indian example I will consider here concerns mining in the north-
eastern Indian state of Odisha, in another forested area known as the 
Niyamgiri Hills. I focus on an episode involving the local subsidiaries and 
Odisha state government partners of Vedanta Resources, a company listed on 
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the London Stock Exchange with interests in metals, gas, oil and power on 
four continents and current annual revenue of around US $11 billion.13  
In 2004, Vedanta was granted a licence to mine bauxite in the Niyamgiri Hills 
as part of the Odisha state government’s efforts to attract foreign investment. 
The area, in addition to being environmentally sensitive, is the historic and 
spiritual home of an indigenous group, the Dongria Kondh. Several public 
interest petitions were filed about the issue, and as a result the Supreme Court 
and its Central Empowered Committee become involved in this issue as they 
had in the Bellary case. Indeed, the Court became involved at what elsewhere 
might seem an unusually early stage in a mining application: witness the 
somewhat grumpy observation in a submission by the Attorney-General of 
India that ‘Vedanta was seeking clearance from the Court even before its 
proposal was placed before the Central Government’.14 
In a 2007 judgment, the Supreme Court gave pride of place to the principle of 
Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and ruled that the project could not 
go ahead without the local community’s agreement. It also, however, 
suggested that the project could be approved with greater safeguards and, in 
August 2008, it gave clearance to a Vedanta proposal revised along these 
lines. The Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Attorney-General, 
however, declined to adopt the Supreme Court’s decision as their own and 
continued with their investigations. As a result of appeals by Vedanta against 
adverse decisions in these processes, and amidst continuing community 
concerns and protests, the issue returned to the Supreme Court. The Court 
took note of fresh evidence of environmental violations, but its most decisive 
finding was that the issue of tribal religious interests in the area should be 
                                                 
13 Vedanta is not, however, the only actor with operations or troubles in the area; the South 
Korean multinational steel-maker Posco, for example, has been involved in a related saga 
nearby. See, eg, Dillip Satapathy, ‘Posco Closes Last Chapter in Odisha Project’, Business 
Standard (online), 18 March 2017 <https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/ 
posco-closes-last-chapter-in-odisha-project-117031700810_1.html>; Sandeep Sahu, ‘Why 
Green Nod to Odisha Project May Not Be End of Posco’s Troubles’, First Post (online), 21 
December 2014 <https://www.firstpost.com/business/why-green-nod-to-odisha-project-may-
not-be-end-of-poscos-troubles-1336447.html>. Vendanta itself is also in difficulties 
elsewhere. On the ongoing controversies around its iron ore mining in Goa, see, eg, Raman 
Kirpal, ‘Yeddy, Reddy, Kamat? Goa’s Rs 800 cr Mining Scam Is Next’, First Post (online), 
18 Oct 2011 <https://www.firstpost.com/politics/yeddy-reddy-kamat-goas-rs-800-cr-mining-
scam-is-next-76286.html>. 
14 Letter from Office of Shri Goolam E Vahanvati, Attorney-General for India, 20 July 2010, 
<http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/attorney-general-of-india20072010-1.pdf>. I am 
referred to this letter by Leena Ajit Kaushal, ‘A Case Study on Vendanta Alumina Ltd (VAL) 
Orissa India: State and FDI versus Democracy?’ (2017) 8(1) Valahian Journal of Economic 
Studies 107, 110, also summarising some of these events.  
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referred back to the Gram Sabha. This is the lowest level of India’s 
government, made up of village-level bodies comprising every local resident 
over the age of 18. Gram Sabha meetings in the affected areas rejected the 
project in light of the religious and other interests of the local community in 
the Niyamgiri Hills, and the Supreme Court turned down Vedanta’s challenge 
to the Gram Sabha’s decision in May 2016.15 
The case is a useful supplement to the Bellary case because of the greater role 
of other government actors. The jurisdictional tangle in the case (whose full 
complexities I have not set out here) is a testament to what happens when the 
Supreme Court acts with the intention of managing the issue itself, as it did to 
a greater degree in the Bellary case, but where other government actors also 
continue to pursue processes of their own. The Court’s ultimate decision also 
rests very heavily on traditional sources of government policy, as opposed to 
the Bellary decision’s reliance on the CEC’s findings. The 2013 judgment is 
based on the requirements of national legislation, especially the Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act, passed in 2006, and associated government policy documents and 
regulations. 
The Vedanta case should therefore temper one of the concerns that naturally 
arise from the sort of sweeping judicial action illustrated by the Bellary case, 
namely that this is reckless judicial unilateralism. It is quite true that PIL 
invests judges with a lot of discretion, and that some judges can exercise this 
discretion heedless of justified objections, pursuing agendas of their own, 
breaking free of important procedural and other constraints on judicial 
behaviour, and making mistakes of all kinds while wasting time and money.16 
This is no way to conduct good regulation of MNC activities or anything else, 
and any fair assessment of PIL’s ability to contribute to MNC regulation has 
to take account of this risk. But the Vedanta case shows that the judicial role 
in PIL often demands more nuanced assessment. It may be, but by no means 
necessarily has to be, a unilateral exercise in which judges try to design 
policies out of whole cloth, with or without the assistance of experts, via the 
commission device. It sometimes is that, and often struggles when it is, 
though sometimes there is no better option. But PIL is much more obviously 
an exercise in claiming ultimate constitutional authority than it is about 
                                                 
15 The key judgment is Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd v Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(2013) 6 SCC 476, which also summarises the earlier developments in the case. The Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre has a useful chronology of the main events, 
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/vedanta-resources-lawsuit-re-dongria-kondh-in-
orissa>. 
16 See above n 11. 
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insisting on exclusive authority. As a recent study of the Indian judiciary’s 
role in the telecommunications sector observes: 
[T]he Supreme Court of India has been extremely aggressive in claiming 
the final word on legal and constitutional matters. However … [it] has been 
less interested in stamping its own authority on issues, and has instead 
sought to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the telecom regulatory 
institutions.17 
Later in this article, when discussing the Colombian Constitutional Court, I 
will pay more explicit attention to this master move to make the constitution 
the ultimate authority on all issues, and thus to make the court of highest 
constitutional jurisdiction the ultimate authority on all issues. The point here 
is about the nuanced role the Indian Court is playing. We need to see beyond a 
view in which the Bellary case is merely about risky judicial recklessness and 
the Vedanta case is merely about the government re-asserting itself so that 
things return to a more traditional pattern of judicial deference. The Vedanta 
case is not, as it may seem, about the court (ultimately) settling down again to 
the obedient implementation of statutes. 
Instead, the Supreme Court in Vedanta is potentially just as willing to do and 
decide things itself as it was in the Bellary matter. This is the import of its 
2008 and 2009 decisions, where it intervened strongly as a manager of the 
issue. We can imagine a Vendanta counterfactual in which other government 
actors had been less active in response and so the case would have stayed 
under judicial management as happened in the Bellary example. But instead, 
here, the government was more active. And instead of this leading the 
Supreme Court to retreat from non-traditional boldness to traditional 
deference, we should instead understand this as a situation where a court has 
the same view of its own ultimate managerial responsibility but simply has 
more, and more useful, government activity to draw on in discharging it.  
That the Court in Vedanta is not just passively implementing government 
statutes can be seen in the free discretion it exercises throughout. For instance, 
a more formalist court might well have held that the legal concerns being 
raised in 2013 had already been ruled on in 2008 and 2009 when the court 
approved the project. It might therefore have declined to re-open the issues in 
2013 on grounds of res judicata. A more formalist court might also have ruled 
that the requirements of the 2006 Act, central to the crucial decision to refer 
                                                 
17 Arun K Thiruvengadam and Piyush Joshi, ‘Judiciaries as Crucial Actors in Southern 
Regulatory Systems: A Case Study of Indian Telecom Regulation’ (2012) 6 Regulation and 
Governance 327, 340. 
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questions back to the Gram Sabha, could not apply retrospectively to a licence 
application process that had begun in 2004. But, instead, the Court understood 
itself to have the same ongoing responsibility to find a general solution to the 
problem that it exercised in Bellary, and so it found it natural to take up the 
evolving issue again in 2013. It is just that it then had to do less of the entailed 
policy work itself, because the government here had done more. 
This affects how we understand Southern institutional dynamics. It is a further 
illustration of the greater centrality that courts can assume even in contexts 
where Southern government officials are far from inactive themselves. (Thus 
a widespread pattern of weak government can give rise to a system where a 
court of established broad authority stays unusually active even in cases 
where the government has not acted weakly).  
But it also illustrates another opportunity for Northern action, and for 
leveraging limited or imperfect efforts. One of the old concerns about 
activities in Southern contexts is that it is much easier for Northern actors to 
help design cutting-edge policy frameworks and shiny, new legislation than to 
get the results implemented. One of the familiar fears, therefore, is that this 
policy- and legislation-drafting work might be wasted effort, or even actively 
negative if it serves to gives cover to government inaction or malfeasance. 
What the Vedanta case shows is how a PIL-type court stands ready to use 
whatever supports are available. It can try to fill in policy voids itself where it 
has to. But PIL often works best as a mechanism for getting pre-existing 
statutes and other policy frameworks implemented, filling in only smaller 
gaps.18  
From the perspective of Northern or Southern actors, this means that 
contributions that might be stillborn on their own can take on a new 
significance, and a potential second life, as supports of judicial action. Even 
absent any government implementation or enactment at all, a new policy 
instrument may serve as a source of policy ideas and as fuel for judicial 
action. Enactment will make it more useful still, even if the government’s 
motives are purely cosmetic and no steps towards meaningful implementation 
are taken — because it can be very effective, both practically and politically, 
for judges to be able to present themselves as assisting to enforce a 
government’s own policies. And whatever genuine efforts at government 
implementation are forthcoming, or can be induced, can similarly be built on. 
Pessimism on that score is not always justified: witness the contrasting actions 
of the state and national governments in the Vedanta case, with only the state 
                                                 
18 Fowkes, above n 12, 446; Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and 
Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008) 141. 
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government conforming to the negative stereotype. But even where pessimism 
is justified, the judicial possibilities mean that the fate of the whole effort does 
not stand or fall on what Southern political leaders choose to do. This is not a 
decisive reason to avoid Southern policy efforts and to focus instead of 
Northern channels. Since a PIL court can potentially get mileage from a 
whole range of imperfect efforts, supporters can justifiably be less risk-averse 
when deciding whether to start engaging in that work. 
III INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN 
REGIONAL SYSTEM 
The arguments just made naturally have diminishing returns in systems with 
weaker or more deferential courts. The Indian Supreme Court is unusually 
powerful and pursues an unusually independent agenda. However, regional 
systems have some ability to play the same role, even where the odds seemed 
to be stacked against them in ways that cause many commentators to dismiss 
their significance. This can be illustrated by two cases from the African 
human rights system concerning the impact of commercial activity on 
indigenous communities.  
The African continent-wide justice system enforces, among other things, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other international rights 
instruments ratified by the African states parties. In 2010, the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights delivered its verdict on a case 
concerning the Endorois, a tribal community evicted from their ancestral land 
in the 1970s by the Kenyan government to make way for ruby mining and 
tourist development.19 In 2017, the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights (which, unlike the Commission, has the power to make binding orders) 
ruled on a case concerning another tribal group in Kenya, the Ogiek, who had 
been fighting eviction orders from their ancestral land issued in 2009.20 
In each case, the Kenyan domestic courts had not provided an effective 
remedy. The Endorois had litigated in 1998 and 2000 in the Nakuru High 
Court and had the case dismissed both times.21 In the Ogiek matter, several 
cases had been filed and some were still pending, but had been subject to 
                                                 
19 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council)/Kenya (Comm 276/03) (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 2009) 59 <http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/276.03/>. 
20 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya (2017) Application No 
006/2012, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
21 Centre for Minority Rights Development, above n 19, 59. 
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extraordinary delays (10–17 years), apparently chiefly due to government 
stalling tactics.22 In each case, the African regional system proved willing to 
act instead. The Endorois decision was the first in the world to be based on the 
right to development (along with other rights). The Ogiek decision was the 
first in Africa to be based in part on the rights of indigenous groups to land, 
culture and religion, free disposal of wealth and natural resources, and 
economic, social and cultural development. In legal terms, both represent 
sweeping victories for the indigenous groups concerned.23 Their legal findings 
are also of great significance in an African context where many states have 
weak records on the issue, including states with good governance records in 
other respects, such as Botswana.24 The Endorois and Ogiek decisions, and 
their sweeping legal findings, appear to be signs of intent on the part of the 
regional human rights system to play a stronger role in this area. 
Of course, implementation concerns can loom particularly large in such cases. 
The government of Kenya ostensibly welcomed the Endorois decision at the 
time but thereafter pursued delaying tactics. This led to the African 
Commission’s first ever resolution against a state party for non-
implementation of a Commission decision, issued in November 2013, and the 
formation of a Task Force by the Kenyan government in October 2014. That 
too stalled, and Kenya was criticised by UN bodies in 2016 and 2017 for its 
failure to give effect to the decision. A memorandum was then signed with the 
Kenyan Wildlife service recognising Endorois rights, and there matters 
                                                 
22 African Commission v Kenya, above n 20, 93–6. 
23 For commentary, see Elizabeth Ashamu, ‘Centre for Minority Rights Development (Keyna) 
and Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya: A 
Landmark Decision from the African Commission’ (2011) 55 Journal of African Law 300; 
Wilmien Wicomb and Henk Smith, ‘Customary Communities as ‘Peoples’ and Their 
Customary Tenure as ‘Culture’: What We Can Do with the Endorois Decision’ (2011) 11 
African Human Rights Law Journal 422; Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Becoming Indigenous in the 
Pursuit of Justice: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Endorois’ 
(2012) 111 African Affairs 24; Ricarda Rösch, ‘Indigenousness and Peoples’ Rights in the 
African Human Rights System: Situating the Ogiek Judgment of the African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (2017) 50 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 242; Lucy Claridge, 
‘Litigation as a Tool for Community Empowerment: The Case of Kenya’s Ogiek’ [2018] 
Erasmus Law Review 57. 
24 On which see, eg, James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation and 
Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Addendum: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Botswana UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.2 (2 June 2010); Amelia Cook and Jeremy Sarkin, ‘Is 
Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human Rights Versus 
Economic Development’ (2010) 19 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 453, 
455; Jacqueline S Solway, ‘Navigating the “Neutral” State: “Minority” Rights in Botswana’ 
(2002) 28 Journal of Southern African Studies 711. 
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currently stand.25 The government of Kenya has also (and much more 
quickly) appointed a Task Force to implement the Ogiek ruling, albeit in the 
face of concerns that the Ogiek community was not consulted and the Task 
Force does not include any Ogiek members.26 It remains otherwise too early 
to assess implementation efforts on the 2017 Ogiek ruling, although the 
Endorois’ story does not inspire confidence. 
As a more general matter, it is also clear that the African regional judicial 
system is not yet nearly as powerful as its counterparts in the European and 
the Inter-American regional systems. The development of both those systems 
strongly suggest that the power of regional judicial systems has much to do 
with the willingness and ability of national courts in the countries concerned 
to absorb the rulings and enforce them on the domestic plane. The African 
system, for the most part, awaits comparable developments. It will not do, 
then, to get too starry-eyed about these decisions. But this should not lead us 
to dismiss their significance, or the significance of these judicial institutions in 
our assessment of the regulation of corporate supply chains. Our calculations 
will go awry if they use outdated views about the passivity of the African 
regional system, based on the world of two decades ago, when only the 
Commission existed and when it was, in addition, much less assertive. They 
will also go awry if they simply do not take account of the African regional 
system at all on grounds of general Afro-pessimism. 
For one thing, we should use a realistic yardstick to assess these African 
cases, which invariably take time and encounter implementation difficulties. 
Even in the context of a much stronger and more established judicial 
institution, the Indian case of the Dongria Kondh in the Niyamgiri Hills 
produced an extended saga running over 12 years. We should not, therefore, 
write off the Endorois and Ogiek cases as failures merely because their 
implementation has been protracted. 
                                                 
25 ESCR-Net, ‘First Meeting of the Kenyan Task Force for the Implementation of the Endorois 
Decision’ (24 November 2014) <https://www.escr-net.org/news/2014/first-meeting-kenyan-
task-force-implementation-endorois-decision>; Minority Rights Group International, ‘Kenya: 
Protecting the Endorois’ Right to Land’ (13 November 2016) <http://minorityrights.org/law-
and-legal-cases/centre-for-minority-rights-development-minority-rights-group-international-
and-endorois-welfare-council-on-behalf-of-the-endorois-community-v-kenya-the-endorois-
case/>.  
26 Minority Rights Group International, ‘Kenyan Government Task Force to Implement African 
Court’s Ogiek Judgment Deeply Flawed, MRG and OPDP say’ (Press Release, 13 November 
2017) <http://minorityrights.org/2017/11/13/kenyan-government-task-force-implement-
african-courts-ogiek-judgment-deeply-flawed-mrg-opdp-say/>; Eric Matara, ‘Ogiek Reject 
Land Rights Implementation Team’, Daily Nation (online), 27 March 2018 <https://www 
.pressreader.com/kenya/daily-nation-kenya/20180327/281715500164832>. 
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For another, even if their implementation were to continue to be defective, 
decisions like these are potential examples of how imperfect developments in 
one context can serve to support actions by other interested parties. From the 
perspective of standard Northern enforcement strategies, their chief 
significance may be that they set a progressive Southern standard — in the 
case of the Endorois decision, a world first. Northern actors are now able to 
invoke that standard, something of particular value in a general context where 
Northern colonialism has much to answer for and Northern actors can have a 
credibility problem as a result. Holding African countries to African standards 
can be a different political game, just as a court holding a government to its 
own standards can be. Additionally, from the perspective of both Northern 
and Southern actors, the Ogiek and Endorois cases are points on a trend line, 
showing how civil society bodies are increasingly making strategic use of 
litigation in the African system. The enforcement difficulties, therefore, 
should not lead us either to conclude that these cases will prove useless to the 
communities concerned, or to miss the significance of the trend they represent 
for regulating MNC supply chains rooted in African contexts.  
IV THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATORY STATE: 
COLOMBIA 
We could easily continue the list of Southern cases, but it is also valuable to 
get a sense of the master doctrinal argument that increasingly underpins this 
activity. The argument in question is by no means a uniquely Southern 
argument, but it has found powerful expression there, and nowhere more so 
than in the Constitutional Court created by the 1991 Colombian Constitution. 
When thinking about courts in the context of regulation it is conventional to 
see the judiciary as only a partial check on the activities of regulators. The 
core of regulatory activity, on this view, happens outside the courts in 
government departments and legislatures. It is in these locations that the 
question, ‘How should we regulate issue X?’ is asked and, at least in 
principle, answered. The judiciary’s role is subsidiary. Judges fill in gaps in 
the regulatory regime as and when individual cases reveal them, tempering 
harsh consequences, and constraining regulatory activity in the partial, often 
procedural, ways that lie at the heart of all systems of administrative law. This 
traditional conception is often expressed by the idea that courts must begin by 
disclaiming any power to decide on the best policy and only ask, for example, 
whether the government’s policy choice is rational. 
Just as PIL breaks with traditional models of litigation, so Colombian 
developments are a challenge to this traditional understanding of the position 
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of courts in the regulatory state. Since local regulatory activity has obvious 
and enormous implications for MNC activity, so does this shift, and thinking 
about regulation in the Global South needs to take account of it.  
A The Constitutional Regulatory State 
The Colombian Constitutional Court has articulated the master teleological 
move in a way that, in the Indian context discussed above, often stays implicit 
or is expressed merely rhetorically. It is a simple enough argument to state 
(and is not unique to Colombia, although the sheer extent of its application 
there might be).27 Constitutions are sometimes thought of as a limited set of 
basic rules and rights-based checks on power. If this view is accepted, then 
constitutional review is a partial matter, about a limited set of concerns. But 
more modern ideas often conceive of the constitution as the all-encompassing 
blueprint for all public activity. Constitutional rights and values are a 
statement of state’s entire basic normative framework, rather than a more 
limited catalogue of certain important things. As a result, in principle, 
anything in such a state can and should be framed in constitutional terms. The 
ultimate measure of anything is whether it fits the constitutional framework; 
the ultimate purpose, a constitutional one. So goes the new master argument. 
This has enormous implications for courts. It means, for instance, that the 
judicial role is not merely to safeguard certain key rules from violation, but to 
do whatever is necessary to give effect to the constitution. That does, of 
course, include responding to negative violations, but it also means working 
more actively to promote constitutional goals. Or, as the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia put it in a key early decision: 
In the legal system of the social state of law, we are dramatically confronted 
with the problem of the necessity of adapting, correcting and conditioning 
the application of law by means of judicial intervention. But this 
intervention is not only manifest as a necessary mechanism to solve a 
dysfunction, but also, and above all, as an indispensable element to improve 
                                                 
27 The roots of the argument are above all German, and in the Global South it is probably most 
commonly if rather loosely associated with the term ‘transformative constitutionalism’, 
originally developed, with somewhat different goals, in the context of post-apartheid South 
African system. See further Hailbronner, above n 2; Karl E Klare, ‘Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146; 
Armin von Bogdandy et al (eds), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The 
Emergence of a New Ius Commune (Oxford University Press, 2017); Vilhena, Baxi and 
Viljoen, above n 11. 
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the conditions of communication between law and society, in other words, 
to favour the achievement of justice.28 
This broad constitutional view also means that judges’ duty to give effect to 
the constitutional purposes of the state is the same whether or not other 
branches of government have first given detailed effect to them in legal 
frameworks or through other action. Under the new master argument, legal 
gaps or omissions by other branches are no excuse. If detailed rules exist, the 
judge must check them against basic constitutional principles and re-interpret 
or invalidate them as necessary. If detailed rules do not exist, the judge must 
develop her own way to ensure that effect is given to the constitutional 
principles. The Colombian Court in 1992 foresaw this need arising often 
because of the complexity of the modern state and also because a weak 
legislature would have difficulty checking a very powerful executive branch:  
The increase in the factual and legal complexity of the contemporary state 
has brought as a consequence a decrease in the regulatory capacity of 
general and abstract norms. In these circumstances the legal text loses its 
traditional predominant position, and principles and judicial decisions, 
previously considered secondary sources within the normative system, 
acquire exceptional importance. This redistribution occurs, above all, for 
functional reasons: since the law can no longer determine all of the possible 
solutions through legal texts, one needs teleological criteria (principles) and 
instruments of a concrete solution (judges) to achieve better communication 
with society.29  
The Court then refers to the positive duty to give effect to values and 
continues: 
But this is not the only reason explaining this change … The difficulties 
derived from the unchecked growth of executive power in the 
interventionist state and of the loss of political leadership of the legislative 
organ, must be compensated, in constitutional democracy, by the 
strengthening of the judicial power … Only in this manner can a true 
equilibrium and collaboration between the powers be achieved; otherwise, 
the executive power will predominate.30 
This sort of move has great normative implications for regulation, our concern 
here. By way of illustration, consider the Court’s starting point in a 2003 
                                                 
28 Decision T-406 of 1992, as excerpted and translated in Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and 
David Landau, Colombian Constitutional Law: Leading Cases (Oxford University Press, 
2017) 28 (emphasis in original). 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. See further especially Landau, above n 3. 
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decision on water rights. Here the Court referred to the concept of ‘Estado 
Social de Derecho’, the first concept mentioned by the 1991 Constitution, 
which is usually translated as a ‘social state of law’, referring to a social 
democratic state grounded on the rule of law.31 (Those familiar with German 
doctrines can also think, roughly, of a combination of the Sozialstaat and 
Rechtsstaat principles). The Colombian court made this the basis of a first-
principle statement of why all regulatory activity, concerning water or 
anything else, is constitutional activity in the service of this conception of the 
state: 
Regulatory agencies have to exercise their competences aiming to achieve 
the goals that justify their existence in a market within a democratic and 
social state grounded on the rule of law (Estado Social de Derecho) … 
Regulation, as a mechanism of State intervention, seeks to guarantee the 
effectiveness of social principles and the adequate operation of the market.32 
In other words, both the free market and regulatory intervention in that market 
must be justified in terms of their ability to achieve the kind of state envisaged 
by the constitution, and it is in these big-picture terms that the court must 
approach regulatory issues. Matters that might traditionally be thought to lie 
within the competence of engineers or economists, and not judges, are thus 
swept into the legal discussion. All these issues are part of an overarching 
constitutional enquiry into what sort of water system best achieves the goals 
of the constitutional state. Or, as René Urueña puts the point: 
The resulting landscape is not just two parallel institutions (the Court and 
regulatory agencies) that either ignore or compete with each other. Instead, 
the constitutional regulatory state is the result of the interaction between the 
neoliberal mind-set of the independent agency, and the human rights 
rationale of the Constitutional Court.33 
Thus all concerns, including traditionally non-legal or non-justiciable ones, 
are relevant to the master constitutional question: has the proper balance been 
struck between the practical business of organising water supplies and the 
social justice concerns of adequate access to water for all? And because it is a 
constitutional question, it is one that, in its entirety, is a question for judges to 
answer. It is in this context that the Court has effectively created a right to 
                                                 
31 Constitution of Colombia (1991), Art 1: ‘Colombia es un Estado social de derecho…’ 
(Colombia is a social state of law…).  
32 Decision C-150 of 2003, quoted in and translated by Rene Urueña, ‘The Rise of the 
Constitutional Regulatory State in Colombia: The Case of Water Governance’ (2012) 6 
Regulation and Governance 282, 291. 
33 Ibid 294. 
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water in its case law, despite there not being an express right to water in the 
constitutional text. Judges will also have ultimate jurisdiction to decide 
whether the proper balance has been struck, for example, between using 
profit-driven market mechanisms to achieve water supply and the social 
justice imperative to ensure access to water for all. Hence the Court’s basis for 
ruling, for example, that water companies may not disconnect the water 
supply of poor users even if these users do not pay their bills.34 
This argument does not necessarily lead to judicial expansionism in general or 
on any given issue. It can represent merely a legal re-framing that transfers no 
real power from more traditional regulatory institutions to the court. The court 
might announce the grand constitutional narrative, claim all-encompassing 
jurisdiction, and then conduct a deferential review that basically accepts the 
government’s version. If so, MNC regulatory activity might find itself often in 
court, but the decisions that matter will still be made elsewhere.  
But jurisdiction is latent power, and even very deferential exercises of it can 
serve to normalise it. And the more the power is acted upon, as it is in 
Colombia, the more regulatory decisions will be uncertain until they have 
been judicially reviewed, and the more judicial review will matter for anyone 
relying on or seeking to affect regulatory outcomes. The Indian examples 
already discussed illustrate where this sort of argument can lead when judges 
actually act to cash it out thoroughly: how it can lead to the judicial 
management of whole issues like forests, to the degree that companies seeking 
licences start with the court, and how it can mean that courts are routinely 
engaging with the all-things-considered question of what regulatory approach 
is best in all its breadth and complexity, which more traditional approaches 
would treat as a matter for other branches of government.35  
In the Colombian context, the potential of this expansive logic to impact on 
commercial activities is probably best illustrated by in an area where many 
would not expect courts to act at all, let alone so expansively – financial 
policy. 
During the financial crisis of the late 1990s, rising interest rates had 
devastating effects on the home mortgages of many Colombians who had 
borrowed under the state system, UPAC, and who found their interest rates 
                                                 
34 The decision referred to is T-546 of 2009. On the Court’s approach to water rights in general, 
see Cepeda Espinosa and Landau, above n 28, 204–12.  
35 For an effort to articulate some the broader ideas behind the Indian Supreme Court’s rise, see 
Nick Robinson, ‘Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court’ 
(2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 1. 
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growing much faster than the rate of inflation. About 100 000 homeowners 
were under threat of foreclosure. The Court intervened in a series of decisions, 
drawing especially on the constitutional right to housing and ideas of the 
proper constitutional relationship between the president, legislature, and the 
Central Bank. The resulting pattern is complex, and incudes deference to both 
the legislature and the Bank on some issues, but it also includes strikingly 
bold judicial findings on matters of policy. In 1999, the Court ruled that, 
under the right to dignified housing in article 51 of the Constitution, certain 
arrangements for the capitalisation of interest would be unconstitutional in 
home mortgages: mortgages could not be structured so that home owners paid 
less than the interest due in a given month, with the unpaid interest adding to 
the principal. Two judges dissented on the basis of research by economists 
suggesting that the Court’s ruling might actually hurt home-owners. The 
following year, in its final judgment in the series, the Court ruled that interest 
could be charged on home mortgages only at a rate below the lowest level 
being charged elsewhere in the economy.36 These were probably the two most 
expansive findings in a complex action that, as noted, also includes patterns of 
deference and more traditional kinds of ruling on the separation of powers. 
But they illustrate how areas of great commercial significance — usually seen 
as well beyond the purview of courts — are readily made subject to judicial 
review if judges so decide, once the master constitutional narrative is in 
operation.  
B The Unconstitutional State of Affairs 
The Colombian example is, lastly, notable for a constitutional doctrine that 
can be understood as a special sub-set of the general master argument just 
discussed. It is more rarely invoked, and so, despite its headline-grabbing 
nature, is less likely to impact MNC activity directly than the more general 
teleological argument. But it is nevertheless a striking datum to add to the 
picture of Southern judicial developments. The doctrine concerns the problem 
of institutional failure. 
Every institution works imperfectly, but sometimes the problem ceases to be 
about a certain number of errors made by a broadly functioning institution and 
becomes one of systematic dysfunction. In these cases, the more traditional 
sorts of individual remedies will usually offer little or no relief. A finding of 
procedural unfairness, for example, often just sends the affected individual 
back to the same institution for a re-hearing. That is probably useful if the 
                                                 
36 Cepeda Espinosa and Landau, above n 28, 154–9. 
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institution has made a mistake and probably useless if the institution is 
broken. 
In response to such situations, the Colombian Constitutional Court has 
developed the doctrine of a state of ‘unconstitutional affairs’, or 
‘unconstitutional conditions’.37 This is a doctrine about broad persistent 
failures to react to large-scale violations of the rights of whole categories of 
people. It is rarely invoked — only nine times in the twenty years since its 
inception in 1997. The most famous early case concerned the problem of 
persons displaced by Colombia’s internal violence, who had mostly fled from 
the countryside to cities. Although a statute provided a framework for 
responding to their situation, implementation was very limited, in part because 
many agencies had partial responsibility and there was no co-ordinated 
response. Describing this as an unconstitutional state of affairs, the Court took 
over the issue in an intervention that had much to do with trying to get the 
necessary administrative mechanisms and procedures established within the 
government.38 
It would take a very serious MNC breach, affecting a large group of people 
and attracting an unusually defective government response, for the actions of 
an MNC to be at the centre of an unconstitutional state of affairs. Examples of 
such a breach are not, of course, impossible to imagine. We might profitably 
wonder, for instance, what the judicial response to the Bhopal disaster and its 
defective aftermath might have been had it occurred later in Indian PIL’s 
development, or had it occurred in today’s Colombia. Examples like that are, 
fortunately, extraordinary. But we can readily imagine situations where a 
government structurally fails to respond to MNC breaches across a particular 
sector with widespread effects, attracting judicial management in response. If 
mining in India’s forests had produced a pattern of national government 
action closer to the passive, complicit or corrupt behaviour of some of the 
state governments, we might well be able to frame the issue plausibly as a 
state of unconstitutional affairs, with massive implications for MNC 
extraction of raw materials from India. The doctrine of unconstitutional affairs 
is therefore worth building into our understanding of what Southern judicial 
review could entail for MNC activity. 
                                                 
37 See ibid 13–14, 179. 
38 The decision, T-25 of 2004 (Constitutional Court of Colombia), is usually referred to as the 
‘Displaced Persons case’. See Cepeda Espinosa and Landau, above n 28, 178–90; Landau, 
above n 3, 359–62. 
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V THE NEXT STEP: NORTH-SOUTH CO-ORDINATION 
The main conclusions of this article — that certain Southern judicial 
developments merit greater attention in our thinking about the regulation of 
corporate supply chains, and that their presence should prompt some re-
thinking — do not, by now, need re-stating. Instead, in conclusion I want to 
highlight certain areas where there is potential for a useful North-South 
dialogue on the issues raised, with the ultimate intent of further breaking 
down the significance of the North-South divide. While there is doubtless 
more room for the co-ordination of activities between North and South, there 
is already quite considerable co-operation in this regard. My suggestions here, 
accordingly, are about the co-ordination of ideas. 
Consider, for example, the idea of the social licence to operate (SLO), which 
has assumed prominence in discussions of corporate social responsibility.39 It 
offers both a useful organising principle for relations between a company and 
the various local stakeholders affected by its business activity, and a practical 
way to express the business case for good local relations. Like many 
discussion of this sort, the SLO debate is usually framed in terms of Northern 
law and institutions. But consider the obvious resonance that it has for the 
examples considered in this paper from India and Africa. The courts we 
discussed are effectively engaged in an effort to stipulate the conditions under 
which commercial activity may occur in their legal systems. They do not, 
however, draw on the SLO conception in doing so, and so the potential for 
useful learning here runs in both directions. 
Southern legal thinking of the kind considered in this paper might draw from 
the SLO concept because of the way it emphasises the ongoing nature of a 
company’s relationships with stakeholders. Free Prior and Informed Consent, 
as a formal concept, is a crucial but once-off checkpoint after which a project 
can proceed, whereas SLO is, in principle, something that can be lost at any 
time and must be continually renewed.40 The Indian Supreme Court’s 2007 
decision in the Vedanta matter gives great weight to FPIC in relation to the 
local indigenous community, and it is a landmark judgment for that reason. 
But the Court’s general attitude to the case, which also seemed to inform its 
                                                 
39 See, eg, Karin Buhmann, ‘Public Regulators and CSR: The ‘Social Licence to Operate’ in 
Recent United Nations Instruments on Business and Human Rights and the Juridification of 
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Operate” in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories’ 
(2012) 37 Resources Policy 346, 349. 
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later decisions on the matter in 2013 and 2016, is far more open-ended, 
involving ongoing evaluation of an evolving issue. The SLO conception is not 
normally applied to judicial activity, but then this sort of ongoing intervention 
is not normal judicial activity, at least as judged by traditional standards. The 
conception offers a powerful way to think about the Court’s decision to refer 
decisions back to low-level local political structures, and to express what the 
judges seem mostly to have left implicit.  
By the same token, Northern efforts to use the SLO concept to promote 
corporate accountability might well profit from drawing on this kind of 
Southern concretisation of the concept, where it exists. The idea that a 
company has lost its social licence to operate should be even more effective 
when this is an expression of hard-law Southern judicial attitudes and not 
merely a conceptualisation for Northern public relations. And, even in the 
absence of a binding judicial order in a particular case, the concept is likely to 
have more teeth the more it draws on Southern courts’ own articulations of 
what it takes to obtain a social licence to operate in their society. The fate of 
an investment like Vedanta’s also offers a cautionary tale — for both sides. 
When applied with binding legal force, SLO can make the investment 
environment uncertain, as any investment will be perennially subject to the 
discretion of a small group of judges. Its potential to discourage investment 
has to be considered alongside its potential to reform it.41  
In the light of Southern judicial developments such as those discussed in this 
article, SLO seems to me a clear example of a North-South conversation 
begging to be had, but it is not the only one. The sort of big-picture 
constitutional reframing of public policy that we saw in the Colombian 
context is striking in itself. Its implications for corporate activity would be 
substantial even if they remained mostly indirect, arising due to the impacts of 
such reframing on state regulatory activity that in turn affects companies. But 
there is potential for far more than that. It is striking that, to my knowledge, 
this sort of master teleological argument has not been applied in the same 
sweeping way to company law itself, whether in Colombia or in other 
Southern jurisdictions that use such arguments. The basic case that 
incorporation serves public purposes is easy to make, and it is equally easy to 
                                                 
41 Reading Southern jurisdictions’ interpretations into these standards can make them more 
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argue that those public purposes should be defined in constitutional terms. 
The basis for the constitutional re-thinking of company law itself is therefore 
latent in moves such as those the Colombian court has been making in the 
regulatory context, and in other systems that are similar in this respect. This 
remains, however, largely unexplored territory. It is a good bet that it will not 
remain so.  
The arguments here are confined to a few hand-picked examples and 
doctrines, selected for argumentative effect. They are in some senses outliers. 
African regional examples remain quite limited, and both India and Colombia 
are at the extreme end of the Southern (or global) scale of judicial creativity 
and expansiveness. But they illustrate a judicialising trend that is often 
uncertain in individual cases but is becoming increasingly established as a 
global matter. This trend is part of what makes it more and more useless to 
generalise in pessimistic tones about the abilities of ‘Southern’ institutions to 
contribute to the regulation of MNCs. It is also why we are perhaps now as 
likely to find good new ideas for responding to this challenge in the South as 
in the North. The Southern trend, in itself, is no substitute for Northern 
activity, and it would not be a substitute even if it were uniformly established 
across Southern jurisdictions, which it assuredly is not. But it does mean that 
Northern activity, more than ever, can frame itself as a complement to 
Southern activity rather than a substitute for Southern inactivity, and our 
mental maps should be re-drawn accordingly. 
